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Abstract
We develop a framework in which individuals’ preferences co-evolve with their abilities to deceive others
regarding their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterized by a level of cognitive
sophistication and by a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is costly, but higher level individuals are
able to completely deceive lower level opponents about their preferences and intentions. Only individuals who
are of the same cognitive level can observe each others preferences. Our main results show that, despite the
limited possibility to observe preferences, and despite the strong form of deception, only efficient population
states can be stable. We extend our model to study preferences that depend also on the opponent’s type.
Keywords: Evolution of Preferences; Indirect Evolutionary Approach, Theory of Mind; Depth of Rea-
soning; Deception. JEL codes: C72, C73, D01, D03, D83.
1 Introduction
For a long time economists took preferences as given. The study of their origin and formation was considered a
question outside the scope of economics. Over the past two decades this has changed dramatically. In particular,
there is now a large literature on the evolutionary foundations of preferences (for an overview, see Robson
& Samuelson, 2011). A prominent strand of this literature is the so-called “indirect evolutionary approach”,
pioneered by Güth & Yaari (1992) (term coined by Güth, 1995). This approach has been used to explain the
existence of a variety of “non-standard” preferences that do not coincide with material payoffs, e.g. altruism,
spite, and reciprocal preferences.1 Typically, the non-materialistic preferences in question convey some form of
commitment advantage that induces opponents to behave in a way that benefits individuals with non-materialistic
preferences, as described by Schelling (1960) and Frank (1987). Indeed, Heifetz et al. (2007) show that this kind
of result is generic.
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1For example, Bester & Güth (1998), Bolle (2000), and Possajennikov (2000) study combinations of altruism, spite, and selfishness.
Ellingsen (1997) finds that preferences that induce aggressive bargaining can survive in a Nash demand game. Fershtman & Weiss
(1998) study evolution of concerns for social status. Sethi & Somanthan (2001) study the evolution of reciprocity in the form of
preferences that are conditional on the opponent’s preference type. In the context of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Guttman (2003) explores the stability of conditional cooperation. Dufwenberg & Güth (1999) study firm’s preferences for large sales.
Güth & Napel (2006) study preference evolution when players use the same preferences in both ultimatum and dictator games.
Koçkcesen & Ok (2000) investigate survival of more general interdependent preferences in aggregative games. Friedman & Singh
(2009) show that vengefulness may survive if observation has some degree of informativeness.
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A crucial feature of the indirect evolutionary approach is that preferences are explicitly or implicitly assumed
to be at least partially observable.2 Consequently the results are vulnerable to the existence of mimics who signal
that they have, say, a preference for cooperation, but actually defect on cooperators, thereby earning the benefits
of having the non-standard preference without having to pay the cost (Samuelson, 2001). The effect of varying
the degree to which preferences can be observed has been investigated by Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001), Ely &
Yilankaya (2001), Dekel et al. (2007), and Herold & Kuzmics (2009). They confirm that the degree to which
preferences are observed decisively influences the outcome of preference evolution.
However, the degree to which preferences are observed is still exogenous in these models. In reality we would
expect both the preferences, and the ability to observe or conceal them to be the product of an evolutionary
process.3 This paper studies the missing link between evolution of preferences and evolution of how preferences are
concealed and detected. In our model the ability to observe preferences, as well as the ability to deceive and induce
false beliefs about preferences, is endogenously determined by evolution, jointly with the evolution of preferences.
Mutual observation of preferences only occurs whether players of the same cognitive level meet. Our main result
is that such a “grain” of perfect observability is sufficient to imply efficient play in any stable population state.
Overview of the Model. As in standard evolutionary game theory we assume an infinite population of
individuals who are uniformly randomly matched to play a symmetric normal form game.4 Each individual
has a type, which is a tuple, consisting of a preference component and a cognitive component. The preference
component is identified with a utility function over the set of outcomes (i.e. action profiles). In an extension we
allow for type-interdependent preferences, which are represented by utility functions that are defined over both
action profiles and the opponent’s type. The cognitive component is simply a natural number, representing the
level of cognitive sophistication of the individual.5 The cost of increased cognition is strictly positive.
When the individuals in a match are of different cognitive levels, the one with the higher level is assumed to
be able to deceive the one with the lower level. For tractability reasons, and in order to “stack the cards” against
our main result, we model a strong form of deception. The deceiver observes the opponent’s preferences perfectly,
and is allowed to choose whatever she wants the deceived party to believe about the deceiver’s intended action
choice. A strategy profile that is consistent with this form of deception is called a deception equilibrium. When
both individuals are of the same cognitive level, we assume that each player observes the opponent’s preferences,
and as a result, the individuals play a Nash equilibrium of the complete information game induced by their
preferences.6
2Gamba (2013) is an interesting exception. She assumes play of a self-confirming equilibrium, rather than a Nash equilibrium, in
an extensive form game. This allows for evolution of non-materialistic preferences even when they are completely unobservable. An
alternative is to allow for a dynamic that is not strictly payoff monotonic. This approach is pursued by Frenkel et al. (2014), who
show that multiple biases (inducing non-materialistic preferences) can survive in plausible non-monotonic evolutionary dynamics
even if they are unobservable, because each approximately compensates for the errors of the others.
3On this topic, Robson & Samuelson (2011) write: “The standard argument is that we can observe preferences because people
give signals – a tightening of the lips or flash of the eyes – that provide clues as to their feelings. However, the emission of such
signals and their correlation with the attendant emotions are themselves the product of evolution. [...] We cannot simply assume
that mimicry is impossible, as we have ample evidence of mimicry from the animal world, as well as experience with humans who
make their way by misleading others as to their feelings, intentions and preferences. [...] In our view, the indirect evolutionary
approach will remain incomplete until the evolution of preferences, the evolution of signals about preferences, and the evolution of
reactions to these signals, are all analysed within the model.” [Emphasis added] (pp. 14–15)
4It is known that positive assortative matching is conducive to the evolution of altruistic behaviour (Hines & Maynard Smith,
1979) and non-materialistic preferences even when preferences are perfectly unobservable (Alger & Weibull, 2013). It is also known
that finite populations allow for the evolution of spiteful behaviours (Schaffer, 1988) and non-materialistic preferences (Huck &
Oechssler, 1999). By assuming that individuals are uniformly randomly matched in an infinite population, we avoid confounding
these effects with the effect of endogenising the degree of observability.
5The one-dimensional representation of cognitive ability reflects the idea that if one is good at deceiving others, then one is more
likely to be good also at reading others and avoiding to be deceived by them. In this paper we simplify this relation by assuming a
perfect correlation between the two abilities, and leave the study of more general relations for future research.
6Our assumption that players of equal levels play Nash equilibrium relies on the, so-called, “folk-theorem of evolutionary game
theory”, which implies that any stable population state must be a Nash equilibrium of the underlying complete information game
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The state of a population is described by a configuration, consisting of a type distribution and a behaviour
policy. The type distribution is simply a finite support distribution on the set of types. The behaviour policy
specifies a Nash equilibrium for each match between cognitive equals, and a deception equilibrium for each match
between types of different cognitive levels. In a neutrally stable configuration all incumbents earn the same, and
if a small group of mutants enter they earn weakly (strictly) less than the incumbents in any focal post-entry
state. A focal post-entry state is one in which the incumbents behave against each other in the same way as
before the mutants entered.
Results. We first show that the behavior of type θ¯ with the highest cognitive level in the incumbent population
(henceforth, “highest type”) in a stable configuration satisfies three properties (Theorem 1). First, type θ¯ plays
efficiently (i.e. maximizing the fitness) when meeting itself. The intuition is that otherwise a highest-type mutant
who mimics the play of θ¯ against all incumbents while playing efficiently against itself, would outperform type
θ¯ (an application of a “secret-handshake” argument, Robson, 1990). The second result is that θ¯ maximizes its
own fitness against all “lower” types (i.e. types with lower cognitive levels). The intuition is that otherwise a
highest-type mutant who mimics the play of θ¯ against most incumbents, except that he maximizes the fitness
against one of the lower types, would outperform type θ¯. Finally we show that a lower type cannot achieve more
than the efficient level of fitness when being matched against θ¯. The intuition is that otherwise a highest-type
mutant who mimics this lower type when being matched with θ¯, while mimicking θ¯ against all other opponents,
would outperform type θ¯.
Next we restrict attention to generic games (i.e., each fitness payoff is independently drawn from a continuous
distribution) and obtain our main result: any stable configuration must induce efficient play in all matches between
all types. The proof can be brief sketched as follows. We first show that any type θ in a stable configuration
must play efficiently when meeting itself. This is because otherwise a mutant could enter, which has the same
level as θ and has the same utility function as θ, except that the efficient action, a¯ is a subjective best-reply to
itself. We show that there exists a focal post-entry state in which the mutant plays the same as the incumbent
θ except playing the efficient profile(a¯, a¯) against itself and possibly against some of the higher types. Next, we
show that any two types must play efficiently. The intuition is that otherwise the mean within-groups fitness is
higher than the between-groups fitness, which implies instability to small perturbations in the frequency of the
types (a type who becomes slightly more frequent will be have higher fitness relative to the other incumbents,
and this will take the population away).
The existing literature (e.g., Dekel et al., 2007) shows that if players perfectly observe the opponent’s prefer-
ences (or do so with sufficiently high probability), then only efficient outcomes are stable. Our key contribution
is showing that a “grain” of perfect observability is enough to imply efficiency. While, the existing models assume
that any player perfectly observe the preferences of any other player, our model only assumes perfect observability
as a “tie-breaking” rule: players with equal-levels s to perfectly observe each other’s preferences, but by acquiring
a higher cognitive level (which may incur an arbitrarily low cognitive cost), a player can completely deceive the
opponent about his preferences.
Next we make a few observations, which allow us to fully characterize stable configurations in generic games.
First, we observe that any generic game admits at most one efficient action, and that this action is either strict
equilibrium or not a best-reply to itself. In the former case, we show the stability of an homogenous population
players with the lowest cognitive level and with preferences such that the efficient action is dominant. Moreover, if
the cognitive cost required for achieving the second cognitive level is sufficiently low, then this stable configuration
is essentially unique. In any other case (i.e. the underlying game admits no efficient action, or the efficient action
is not a best-reply to itself), there is no stable configuration.
for many evolutionary dynamics (see Nachbar, 1990 for a formal statement and proof).
3
Finally, we note that non-generic games may admit different kinds of stable configurations. One particular
interesting family of non-generic games is the family of zero-sum games, such as the Rock-Paper-Scissors game
(Example ??). We analyse this game and characterize an heterogeneous stable population in which different
cognitive levels co-exist, players with equal levels play the Nash equilibrium, and players with higher levels beat
their opponents (but this gain is compensated by the higher cognitive costs). The construction is similar to that
of Conlisk (2001).
Variants and Extensions. As mentioned above, our main result relies on having full observability as the
“tie-breaking” rule. In Section 5 we consider the opposite assumption, namely, that players with equal level do
not observe each others preferences. We show that this variant yields very different results. Specifically, we show
that (1) any pure strict equilibrium (possibly, non-efficient) of the underlying game is stable, and (2) the highest
type always play a Nash equilibrium (again, not necessarily efficient) when being matched against themselves.
Thus, whether stability implies efficiency or Nash equilibrium behavior, crucially depends on “grain” of
exogenous observability assumption in the matches between equals in our model. The existing literature (e.g.,
Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001); Ely & Yilankaya (2001); Dekel et al. (2007); Norman (2012)) show that if players
cannot observe each other’s preferences, then only Nash equilibria can be stable. Our results show that a “grain”
of non-observability among players with equal levels is enough to imply strong relations between stability and Nash
equilibria, even though our setup allows a player to spend (possibly arbitrarily low) additional cognitive cost,
obtains a higher level than his opponent, and fully observe his preferences.
In most of the paper we deal only with “type-neutral” preferences that depends only over action profiles.
Section 6 extends the analysis to interdependent preferences that may also depend on the opponent’s type.
Herold & Kuzmics (2009) study a similar setup while assuming perfect observability of types among all players.
Their key result shows that any mixed action that yields each player a payoff above his maxmin payoff, can be
the outcome of a stable configuration. We show a slightly weaker extension of this result while assuming only
perfect observability among players with equal levels. Specifically, we show that pure stable population states
(i.e. populations in which everyone play the same pure action) are essentially Nash equilibria that yield each
player a payoff above the maxmin value. We conclude by characterizing stable configurations in the “Hawk-Dove”
game (Section 6.4). We show that such games admit heterogeneous stable configurations in which players with
different levels co-exist, each type has discriminating preferences that induce cooperation only against itself, and
higher types “exploit” lower types (and this is compensated by their higher cognitive levels.)
In Appendix B we briefly present another variant of the model in which the deceiver is not able to tailor
the attempted deception to the current opponent’s type. Instead, an individual has to use the same attempted
deception against all opponents. One can show that qualitatively similar results also hold with this less flexible
form of deception.
Further related literature. “Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001) and Ely & Yilankaya (2001) investigate the case in
which preferences are unobservable, and all preferences defined over outcomes are allowed. They show that only
Nash equilibria of the game with material/fitness payoffs can be implemented by evolutionarily stable preferences.
More generally, Dekel et al. (2007) study environments in which there is a fixed probability that a player observes
the preferences of the opponent. They confirm the previous results for unobservable preferences. Furthermore,
they show that if preferences are perfectly, or almost perfectly, observable, then only efficient outcomes can
be supported by neutrally stable preferences.7 Our results indicate that when deception is introduced and
observation is endogenised, then a pure profile has to be both Nash and efficient in order to be the sole outcome
supported by neutrally stable preferences. Herold & Kuzmics (2009) expand the framework of Dekel et al. (2007)
7See Norman (2012) for related results in a dynamic model.
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to include interdependent preferences, i.e. preferences that depend on the opponent’s preference type. Under
perfect or almost perfect observability, if all preferences that depend on the opponent’s type are considered, then
any symmetric outcome above the minmax material payoff is evolutionarily stable. In our setting a pure profile
also has to be a Nash equilibrium in order to be the sole outcome supported by evolutionarily stable preferences.
Herold & Kuzmics (2009) find that non-discriminating preferences (including selfish materialistic preferences)
are typically not evolutionarily stable on their own. In contrast, certain preferences that exhibit discrimination
are evolutionarily stable. Similarly, evolutionary stability requires the presence of discriminating preferences also
in our setup.”
There is a large literature in biology and evolutionary psychology on the evolution of ‘theory of mind’ (Premack
&Woodruff 1979). According to the “Machiavellian intelligence” hypothesis (Humphrey, 1976), and “social brain”
hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998), the extraordinary cognitive abilities of humans evolved as a result of the demands
of social interactions, rather than the demands of the natural environment: in a single-person decision problem
there is a fixed benefit of being smart, but in a strategic situation it may be important to be smarter than the
opponent. From an evolutionary perspective, the potential advantage of a better theory of mind has to be traded
off against the cost of increased reasoning capacity. Increased cognitive sophistication in the form of higher-order
beliefs is associated with non-negligible costs (Holloway, 1996, Kinderman et al. 1998). Our model incorporates
these features.
There is a smaller literature on the evolution of strategic sophistication within game theory; see, e.g. Stahl
(1993), Banerjee & Weibull (1995), Stennek (2000), Conlisk (2001), Abreu & Sethi (2003), Mohlin (2012),
Rtischev (2012), and Heller (2015). As in these papers, we provide results to the effect that different degrees of
cognitive sophistication may co-exist.
Kimborough et al. (2014) construct a model to demonstrate the advantage of having a theory of mind (un-
derstood as an ability to ascribe stable preferences to other players) over learning by reinforcement. In novel
games the ascribed preferences allow the agents with a theory of mind to draw on past experience whereas a
reinforcement learner without such a model has to start over again. Hopkins (2014) explains why costly signaling
of altruism may be especially valuable for those agents who have a theory of mind.
Robson (1990) initiated a literature on evolution in cheap talk games by formulating the secret handshake
effect: evolution selects an efficient stable state if mutants can send messages that the incumbents either do not
see or not benefit from seeing. Against the incumbents a mutant plays the same action as the incumbents do,
but against other mutants the mutant plays an action that is a component of the efficient equilibrium. Thus
the mutants are able to invade unless the incumbents are already playing efficiently. See also Matsui (1991). As
pointed out by Wärneryd (1991), and Schlag (1993), among others, problems arise if either the incumbents use
all available messages (so that there is no message left for the incumbents to coordinate on) or the incumbents
follow a strategy that induces the mutants to play an action that lowers the mutants’ payoffs below those of the
incumbents. Kim & Sobel (1995) use stochastic stability arguments, and Wärneryd (1998) uses complexity costs,
to circumvent this problem. Similarly, evolution selects efficient outcome in our model, where the preferences
also serve the function of messages
Structure. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 we
define our stability notions. The results for the main model are presented in Section 4. Section 5 deals with
a variant in which a player cannot observe the preferences of an opponent with the same cognitive level. 6
extends the model to include type-interdependent preferences. In Section 1 we discuss related literature. Section
7 concludes. Appendix A contains proofs not in the main text. Appendix B presents a variant of the model with
uniform deception. Appendix C formally constructs heterogeneous stable populations in Rock-Scissor-Paper and
Hawk-Dove games.
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2 Model
We consider a large population of agents, each of which is endowed with a type that determines her subjective
preferences and her cognitive level. The agents are randomly matched to play a symmetric two-player game.
A dynamic evolutionary process of cultural learning, or biological inheritance, increases the frequency of more
successful types. In the next section, we present a static solution concept to capture stable population states in
such environments.
2.1 Underlying Game
Consider a symmetric two-player normal form game G with a finite set A of pure actions and a set ∆ (A) of
mixed actions (or strategies). We use the letter a (σ) to describe a typical pure action (mixed action). Payoffs
are given by pi : A × A → R, where pi (a, a′) is the payoff to a player using action a against action a′. The
payoff function is extended to mixed actions in the standard way, where pi (σ, σ′) denotes the material payoff to
a player using strategy σ, against an opponent using strategy σ′. With a slight abuse of notation let a denote
the degenerate mixed strategy that puts all weight on pure strategy a. We adopt this convention for probability
distributions throughout the paper.
Remark 1. The restriction to symmetric games is without loss of generality when dealing with interactions in a
single population. In cases in which the interaction is asymmetric, it can be captured in our setup (as is standard
in the literature; see, e.g. Selten, 1980 and Samuelson, 1991) by embedding the asymmetric interaction in a
larger, symmetric game in which nature first randomly assigns the players to roles in the asymmetric interaction.
2.2 Types
We imagine a large (technically infinite) population of individuals who are uniformly randomly matched to play
the game G. Each individual i in the population is endowed with a type
θ = (u, n) ∈ Θ = U × N,
consisting of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) preferences, identified with a utility function, u ∈ U and a cognitive
level n ∈ N. Let ∆ (Θ) be the set of all finite support probability distributions on Θ. A population is represented
by a finite support type distribution µ ∈ ∆ (Θ). Let C (µ) denote the support (carrier) of type distribution
µ ∈ ∆ (Θ). Elements of C (µ) will be called incumbents. Given a type θ, we use uθ and nθ to refer to its
preferences and cognitive level, respectively.
In the main model we assume that the preferences are defined over action profiles, as in Dekel et al. (2007).
This means that any preferences can be represented by a utility function of the form
u : A×A→ R.
The set of all possible (modulo affine transformations) utility functions on A×A is U = [0, 1]|A|2 . Let BRu (σ′)
denote the set of best replies to strategy σ′ given preferences u, i.e. BRu (σ′) = arg maxσ∈∆(A) u (σ, σ′).
Later, in Section 6, we analyse type-interdependent preferences, which depend also on the opponent’s type,
as in Herold & Kuzmics (2009). In contrast preferences defined solely over action profiles will be referred to as
type-neutral preferences.
There is a fitness cost to increased cognition, represented by a positive and strictly increasing cognitive cost
function k : N→ R+. The fitness payoff of an individual equals the material payoff from the game, minus the
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cognitive cost. Let kn denote the cost of having cognitive level n. Hence kθ = knθ denotes the cost of having
type θ. Without loss of generality, we assume that k1 = 0. In some of our results we will make the additional
assumption that k2 is sufficiently small.
2.3 Configurations
A complete description of a state of the population is constituted by a type distribution and a behaviour policy
for each type in the support of the type distribution. An individual’s behaviour is assumed to be (subjectively)
rational in the sense that it maximizes her subjective preferences given the belief she has about the opponent’s
expected behaviour. However, her beliefs may be incorrect, if she is deceived by her opponent. An individual is
deceived if and only if her opponent is of a higher cognitive level.
If two individuals of the same cognitive level are matched to play, then they play a Nash equilibrium of the
game induced by their preferences. Given two preferences u, u′ ∈ U , let NE (u, u′) ⊆ ∆ (A) ×∆ (A) be the set
of mixed equilibria of the game induced by the preferences u and u′, i.e.
NE (u, u′) = {(σ, σ′) ∈ ∆ (A)×∆ (A) : σ ∈ BRu (σ′) and σ′ ∈ BRu′ (σ)} .
Remark 2. Similar to most of the existing literature of the indirect evolutionary approach (e.g., Güth & Yaari,
1992, Dekel et al., 2007, Section 3), we assume full observability of the opponent’s preferences. However, while
the existing literature assumes this for all interactions, we only assume this when two incumbents with the same
cognitive level interact. When two agents with different levels meet, the observability is endogenously determined
by the deception efforts of the player with the higher level, and the observability assumption is only used as a
“tie breaking rule”. In Section XXX we analyse the opposite “tie breaking rule”, according to when agents with
the same cognitive level interact, they do not observe the opponent’s preferences.
If two individuals of different cognitive levels are matched to play, then the individual with the higher cognitive
level (henceforth, the higher type) observes the opponent’s preferences perfectly, and is able to deceive the
opponent (henceforth, the lower type). The deceiver is allowed to choose whatever she wants the deceived party
to believe about the deceiver’s intended action choice. The deceived party best responds given her possibly
incorrect belief.
For simplicity, we assume that if the deceived party has multiple best replies, then the deceiver is allowed to
break indifference, and choose which of the best replies she wants the deceived party to play. Consequently the
deceiver is able to induce the deceived party to play any strategy that is a best reply to some belief about the
opponent’s mixed action, given the deceived party’s preferences.
Given preferences u ∈ U , let Σ (u) denote the set of undominated strategies. By the minmax theorem, Σ (u)
is also the set of actions that are best replies to at least one strategy of the opponent (given the preferences u).
Formally, we define
Σ (u) = {σ ∈ ∆ (A) : there exists σ′ ∈ ∆ (A) such that σ ∈ BRu (σ′)} .
We say that a strategy profile is a deception equilibrium if the strategy profile is optimal from the point of view
of player i under the constraint that player j has to play an undominated strategy. Formally:
Definition 1. Given two types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ , a strategy profile (σ˜, σ˜′) is a deception equilibrium if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A),σ′∈Σ(uθ′ )
uθ (σ, σ′) .
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Let DE (θ, θ′) be the set of all such deception equilibria.
We are now in a position to define our key notion of a configuration, by combining a type distribution with
a behaviour policy, as represented by Nash equilibria and deception equilibria.
Definition 2. A configuration is a pair (µ, b) where µ ∈ ∆ (U) is a type distribution, and b : C (µ)× C (µ) −→
∆ (A) is a behaviour policy such that for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) :
nθ = nθ′ =⇒ (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) ∈ NE (θ, θ′) , and
nθ > nθ′ =⇒ (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) ∈ DE (θ, θ′) .
We interpret bθ (θ′) = b (θ, θ′) as the strategy of type θ when being matched with type θ′.
Given a configuration (µ, b) we call the types in its support the incumbents.
Note that standard arguments imply that for any type distribution µ there exists a mapping b : C (µ) ×
C (µ) −→ ∆ (A) such that (µ, b) is a configuration.
The expected fitness to an individual of type θ in configuration (µ, b) is:
Πθ ((µ, b)) =
∑
θ′∈C(µ)
µ (θ′) · pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ))− kθ.
When all incumbent types have the same expected fitness, we say that the configuration is balanced, and denote
this uniform expected payoff by Π ((µ, b)) .
Remark 3. Our model assumes that a player may use different deceptions against different types with lower
cognitive levels. We note that all our results remain the same (with minor changes to the proofs) in an alternative
setup in which individuals have to use the same mixed action in their deception efforts towards all opponents
with lower cognitive levels. We refer to this as uniform deception. The formal changes in the model that are
required to implement this variant are described in Appendix A.
3 Evolutionary Stability
3.1 Definitions
Recall that a neutrally stable strategy (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973 and Maynard Smith, 1982) is a strategy
that, if played by most of the population, weakly outperforms any other strategy. Similarly, an evolutionarily
stable strategy is a strategy that, if played by most of the population, strictly outperforms any other strategy.
Definition 3. A strategy σ ∈ ∆ (A) is a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) if for every σ′ ∈ ∆ (A) there is some
ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that if ε ∈ (0, ε¯), then p˜i (σ′, (1− ε)σ + εσ′) ≤ p˜i (σ, (1− ε)σ + εσ′). If the weak inequality is
replaced by strict inequality for each σ′ 6= σ, then σ is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
We extend the notions of neutral and evolutionary stability, from strategies to configurations. We begin by
defining the type game that is induced by a configuration.
Definition 4. For any configuration (µ, b) the corresponding type game Γ(µ,b) is the symmetric two-player game
where each player’s strategy space is C (µ), and the payoff to strategy θ, against strategy θ′, is pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ))−
kθ.
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The definition of a type game allows us to apply notions and results from standard evolutionary game
theory, where evolution acts upon strategies, to the present setting where evolution acts upon types. A similar
methodology was used in Mohlin (2012). Note that each type distribution with support in C (µ) is represented
by a mixed strategy in Γ(µ,b).
We want to capture robustness with respect to small groups of individuals, henceforth called mutants, which
introduce new types and new behaviours into the population. Suppose that a fraction ε of the population is
replaced by mutants and suppose that the distribution of types within the group of mutants is µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ).
Consequently the post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ε) ·µ+ ε ·µ′. That is, for each type θ ∈ C (µ)∪C (µ′),
µ˜ (θ) = (1− ε) · µ (θ) + ε · µ′ (θ). In line with most of the literature on the indirect evolutionary approach we
assume that adjustment of behaviour is infinitely faster than the adjustment of the type distribution.8 Thus
we assume that the post-entry type distribution quickly stabilizes into a configuration
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. There may exist
many such post-entry type configurations, all with the same type distribution, but with different behaviour
policies. We note that incumbents do not have to adjust their behaviour against other incumbents in order to
continue playing Nash equilibria, and deception equilibria, among themselves. For this reason, we assume that
the incumbents maintain the same pre-entry behaviour among themselves. In doing so we also follow Dekel et al.
(2007). Formally:
Definition 5. Let (µ, b) and
(
µ˜, b˜
)
be two configurations such that C (µ) ⊆ C (µ˜). We say that (µ˜, b˜) is focal
(with respect to (µ, b)) if θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) implies that b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) .
Standard fixed point arguments imply that for every configuration (µ, b) and every type distribution µ˜ satis-
fying C (µ) ⊆ C (µ˜) , there exists a behaviour policy b˜ such that (µ˜, b˜) is a focal configuration.
Our stability notion requires that the incumbents outperform all mutants in all configurations that are focal
relative to the initial configuration.
Definition 6. A configuration (µ, b) is a neutrally stable configuration (NSC), if for every µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ), there
is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯), it holds that if (µ˜, b˜), where µ˜ = (1− ε) · µ + ε · µ′, is a focal
configuration, then µ is an NSS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜). The configuration (µ, b) is an evolutionarily stable
configuration (ESC) if the same conditions imply that µ is an ESS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜) for each µ
′ 6= µ.
3.2 Remarks
We discuss four issues related to our notion of stability.
1. The main stability notion that we use in the paper is NSC. The stronger notion of ESC is not useful in
our main model because there always exist equivalent types that have slightly different preferences (as the
set of preferences is a continuum) and induce the same behaviour as the incumbents. Such mutants would
always achieve the same fitness as the incumbents in post-entry configurations, and thus ESCs will never
exist. Note that the stability notions in Dekel et al. (2007) and Alger & Weibull (2013) are also based on
neutral stability.9 In Section 6 we study a variant of the model in which the preferences may depend also
on the opponent’s types. This will allow for the existence of ESCs.
2. Observe that Definition 6 implies internal stability with respect to small perturbations in the frequencies
of the incumbent types (because when µ′ = µ, then µ is required to be an NSS in Γ(µ,b)). By standard
arguments, internal stability implies that any NSC is “balanced”: all incumbent types obtain the same
fitness.
8Sandholm (2001) and Mohlin (2010) are exceptions.
9In their stability analysis of homo hamiltonensis preferences Alger & Weibull (2013) disregard mutants who are behaviourally
indistinguishable from homo hamiltonensis upon entry.
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3. By simple adaptations of existing results in the literature, one can show that NSCs and ESCs are dynami-
cally stable. NSCs are Lyapunov stable: no small change in the population composition can lead it away
from µ in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜), if types evolve according to the replicator dynamic (Thomas, 1985, Bomze
& Weibull, 1995). ESCs are also asymptotically stable: populations starting close enough to µ eventually
converge to µ in Γ(µ˜,b˜) if types evolve according to a smooth payoff-monotonic selection dynamic (Taylor
& Jonker, 1978, Cressman, 1997, Sandholm, 2010).
4. The stability notions of Dekel et al. (2007) and Alger & Weibull (2013) only consider monomorphic groups
of mutants (i.e. all mutants having the same type). We also consider stability against polymorphic groups
of mutants (as do Herold & Kuzmics, 2009). One advantage of our approach is that it allows us to
use an adaptation of the well-known notion of ESS, which immediately implies dynamic stability and
internal stability, whereas Dekel et al. (2007) have to introduce a novel notion of stability without these
properties. We note that our results remain similar with an analogous notion of stability that deals only
with monomorphic mutants, except that in this case stability of pure outcomes would imply only a weaker
notion of efficiency that compares the fitness only to symmetric profiles, as discussed in Remark 4.2 below.
4 Results
4.1 Preliminaries
We say that a strategy profile is efficient if it maximizes the sum of fitness payoffs. Formally:
Definition 7. A strategy profile (σ, σ′) is efficient in the game G = (A, pi) if pi (σ, σ′) + pi (σ′, σ) ≥ pi (a, a′) +
pi (a′, a), for each action profile (a, a′).
Let p¯i = maxa,a′∈A (0.5 · (pi (a, a′) + pi (a, a′))) denote the efficient payoff - the average payoff achieved by
players who play an efficient profile. If a symmetric strategy profile (σ∗, σ∗) is efficient, then we say that the
strategy σ∗ is efficient.
A pure Nash equilibrium (a, a) is strict if pi (a, a) > pi (a′, a) for all a′ ∈ A. If a symmetric action profile (a, a)is
a (strict) Nash equilibrium, of the fitness game, then we say that the action a is a (strict) Nash equilibrium, of
the fitness game.
Given a configuration (µ, b) let n¯ = maxθ∈C(µ) nθ denote the the maximal cognitive level of the incumbents.
We refer to incumbents with this cognitive level as the highest types.
A deception equilibrium is fitness maximizing if it maximizes the fitness of the type with the higher level
of the types in the match (under the restriction that the type with the lower level plays an action that is not
dominated given her preferences). Formally:
Definition 8. Let θ, θ′ be two types with nθ > nθ′ . A deception equilibrium (σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ DE (θ, θ′) is fitness
maximizing if:
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ argmaxσ∈∆(A), σ′∈Σ(uθ′ )pi (σ, σ′) .
Let FMDE (θ, θ′) ⊆ DE (θ, θ′) denote the set of all such fitness-maximizing deception equilibria of two types
θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ . Note that FMDE (θ, θ′) might be an empty set (if there is no action profile that maximizes
both the fitness and the subjective utility of the higher type).
A configuration is pure if everyone plays the same action. Formally:
Definition 9. A configuration (µ, b) is pure if there exists a∗ ∈ A such that bθ (θ′) = a∗ for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) .
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With a slight abuse of notation we denote such a pure configuration by (µ, a∗), and we refer to a∗ as the
outcome of the configuration.
In order to simplify the notation and the arguments in the proofs we assume throughout this section that
underlying game admits at least 3 actions (i.e. |A| ≥ 3). The results can be extended to games with two actions
but this makes the notation more cumbersome and the proofs less instructive.
4.2 Characterization of the Highest Types’ Behavior
In this section we characterize the behavior of an incumbent type, θ¯ = (u, n¯), which has the highest level of
cognition in the population. We show that the behavior satisfies the following three conditions:
1. Type θ¯ plays an efficient action when meeting itself.
2. Type θ¯ maximizes its fitness in all interactions with types with lower cognitive levels.
3. Any opponent with a lower cognitive level achieves at most p¯i when being matched with θ¯.
Theorem 1. Let (µ∗, b∗)be an NSC, and θ, θ¯ ∈ C (µ∗).
1. If nθ¯ = n¯ thenpi
(
bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯
(
θ¯
))
= p¯i.
2. If nθ < nθ¯ = n¯ then
((
bθ¯ (θ) , bθ
(
θ¯
))) ∈ FMDE (θ¯, θ) .
3. If nθ < nθ¯ = n¯ then pi
(
bθ
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯ (θ)
) ≤ p¯i.
The formal proof can be found in the appendix. here we provide a brief sketch of it. The proof utilises mutants
(denoted θ1, θ2, and θˆ below) with the highest cognitive level n¯ and with a specific kind of utility functions, called
indifferent and pro-generous, that make a player indifferent between all their own actions, but may make the
player prefer the opponent to take an action that allows the player to obtain the highest possible fitness payoff.
1. To prove part 1 of the Theorem, assume to the contrary that pi
(
bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯
(
θ¯
))
< p¯i. Let a1, a2 ∈ A be
any two actions such that (a1, a2) is an efficient action profile (i.e. 0.5 · (pi (a1, a2) + pi (a1, a2)) = p¯i).
Consider two mutant types θ1 and θ2, (θ1 6= θ2) which are of the highest cognitive level that is present in
the population, and have indifferent and pro-generous utility functions. Suppose equal fractions of these
two mutant types enter. There is a post-entry population, in which; the incumbents keep their pre-entry
play among each other, the mutants play a fitness-maximizing deception equilibria against lower types,
the mutants mimic the play of θ¯ against all incumbents of level n¯, the mutants mimic θ¯ when facing a
mutant of the same type, and when mutant type θ1 meets mutant type θ2 they play the efficient profile
(a1, a2). In such a focal post-entry configuration a mutant earns weakly higher fitness than θ¯ against the
incumbents, and the mutants on average earn strictly more than θ¯ against the mutants. This implies that
(µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
2. To prove part 2 , assume to the contrary that
((
bθ¯ (θ) , bθ
(
θ¯
))) 6∈ FMDE (θ¯, θ). Suppose mutants of type
θˆ enter. Consider a post-entry configuration in which the incumbents keep their pre-entry play among each
other, and the mutants mimic the play of θ¯, except that they play a fitness-maximizing deception equilibria
against all lower types. The mutants obtains a weakly higher payoff than θ¯ against all types, and a strictly
higher payoff than θ¯ against some lower type. Thus(µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
3. To prove part 3 , assume to the contrary that pi
(
bθ
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯ (θ)
)
> p¯i. Suppose mutants of type θˆ enter.
Consider a post-entry configuration in which the incumbents keep their pre-entry play among each other,
while the mutants; (i) play fitness-maximizing deception equilibria against lower types, (ii) mimic type θ
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against type θ¯, and (iii) mimic the play of θ¯ against all other types. The mutant θˆ earns strictly more than
θ¯ against both θˆ and θ¯. The mutant earns weakly more than θ¯ against all other types. This implies that
(µ∗, b∗) cannot be an NSC.
Remark. The first part of Theorem 1 (a highest types must play an efficient strategy when meeting itself) is
similar to Dekel et al.’s (2007) Proposition 2, which shows that only efficient outcomes can be stable in in a setup
with perfect observability and no deception. We should note that Dekel et al. (2007) use a weaker notion of
efficiency. An action is efficient in the sense of Dekel et al. (2007) (DEY-efficient) if its fitness is highest among
the symmetric strategy profiles (i.e. action a is DEY-efficient if pi (a, a) ≥ pi (σ, σ) for all strategies σ ∈ ∆ (A)).
Observe that our notion of efficiency (Definition 7) implies DEY-efficiency, but the converse is not necessarily
true. The weaker notion of DEY-efficiency is the one relevant in the set up of Dekel et al. (2007), because they
consider only monomorphic groups mutants; i.e. all mutants that enter at the same time are of the same type.
A similar result would hold also in our setup, if we imposed a similar limitation on the set of feasible mutants.
However, without such a limitation, heterogeneous mutants can correlate their play, and our stronger notion of
efficiency is required to characterise stability.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that a game without efficient actions (i.e., a game that has only non-
symmetric efficient profiles) do not admit any NSCs.
Corollary 1. If G does not admit an efficient action (i.e. if pi (a, a) < p¯i for each a ∈ A ), then the game does
not admit any NSC.
4.3 Characterization of Pure NSCs
We now present three results which, together with Theorem 1, allow us to completely characterise NSCs with
pure outcomes. The first proposition shows that in a pure NSC all incumbents have the minimal cognitive level,
since having a higher ability does not yield any advantage when everyone plays the same action.
Claim 1. If (µ, a∗) is an NSC, and (u, n) ∈ C (µ), then n = 1.
Proof. Since all players earn the same game payoff of pi (a∗, a∗) , they must also incur the same cognitive cost,
or else the fitness of the different incumbent types would not be balanced (which contradicts (µ, a∗) being
an NSC). Moreover, this uniform cognitive level must be level 1. Otherwise a mutant of a lower level, who
strictly prefers to play a∗ against all actions, would strictly outperform the incumbents in nearby post-entry
focal configurations.
The following proposition shows that if k2 (the cost of having cognitive level 2) is sufficiently small, then
any outcome of a pure NSC must be a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. The reason is that if the pure
outcome is not a Nash equilibrium, then the population can be invaded by mutants with cognitive level 2, who
deceive the incumbents into thinking they face other incumbents, and best reply to the incumbents’ play.
Proposition 1. Suppose
k2 < δ := min
a,a′,a′′ s.t. pi(a,a′′)6=pi(a′,a′′)
|pi (a, a′′)− pi (a′, a′′)| . (1)
If (µ, a∗) is an NSC, then (a∗, a∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, in fitness payoffs.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that (µ, a∗) is a pure NSC and a∗ is not a best response to itself; i.e. there exist
a′ ∈ A such that pi (a′, a∗) > pi (a∗, a∗). Assume without loss of generality that a′ is a best reply against a∗
(in fitness terms). By Proposition 1, all incumbents have cognitive level 1. Consider a mutant θ′ = (pi, 2) with
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cognitive level 2 and materialistic preferences. There is a focal post-entry configuration in which mutants play
the deception equilibrium (a′, a∗) against the incumbents. Observe that the mutants obtain a strictly higher
payoff when facing an incumbent, than what two incumbents earn against each other:
pi (a′, a∗)− k2 > pi (a′, a∗)− δ ≥ pi (a∗, a∗) .
This implies that if the mutants are sufficiently rare, they outperform the incumbents in the post-entry focal
configuration.
The last proposition shows that any action that is both efficient and a strict Nash equilibrium, can be induced
as the outcome of an NSC. The intuition is as follows (and is similar to Dekel et al., 2007, Proposition 6). Consider
a monomorphic population in which all individuals have cognitive level 1 and the efficient strict Nash action is
a dominant action. The action being strict Nash and efficient, implies that any group of mutants is weakly
outperformed.
Proposition 2. If a¯ is an efficient action and a strict Nash equilibrium (in fitness payoffs), then there exists a
type distribution µ such that (µ, a¯) is an NSC.
Proof. Consider a monomorphic configuration (µ, a¯) consisting of type (θ∗, 1) where all incumbents are of cogni-
tive level 1 and of the same preference type θ∗, which strictly prefers to play a¯ regardless of what the opponent
plays. Observe, that after any mutant’s entry, in all focal post-entry configurations the incumbent θ∗ will always
play a¯ (since a¯ is strictly dominant for θ∗). Since the incumbent is always playing a¯, and (a¯, a¯ ) is a strict Nash
equilibrium of G, mutants that do not play a¯ when they are matched with θ∗ will obtain strictly less fitness than
the incumbents if their population share is sufficiently small. But for mutants that play a¯ whenever they are
matched with θ∗, the incumbents’ average fitness is given by pi(a¯, a¯), and since mutants cannot obtain an average
fitness strictly higher than this when they are matched among themselves (since (a¯, a¯) is efficient), they cannot
obtain a strictly higher average fitness either. We conclude that (µ, a¯) is an NSC.
Part 1 of Theorem 1, together with Propositions 1-2 imply that pure NSCs outcomes are essentially efficient
Nash equilibria. Formally:
Corollary 2 (Characterization of pure NSCs).
1. If (a∗, a∗) is both efficient and a strict Nash equilibrium in fitness payoffs, then it is the outcome of a pure
NSC.
2. If (a∗, a∗) is the outcome of a pure NSC and k2 < δ, then it is both efficient and a Nash equilibrium in
fitness payoffs.
4.4 Characterization of NSCs in Generic Games
In this section we characterize NSCs in generic games, by which we mean games in which any two different action
profiles both gives an individual player different payoffs, and yields different total payoffs.
Definition 10. A (symmetric) game is generic if for each a, a′, b, b′ ∈ A, {a, a′} 6= {b, b′} implies:
pi (a, a′) 6= pi (b, b′) , and pi (a, a′) + pi (a′, a) 6= pi (b, b′) + pi (b′, b) .
For example, if the entries of the payoff matrix pi are drawn from a continuous distribution on an open subset
of the real numbers, then the induced game is generic with probability one.
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Note that a generic game admits at most one efficient action profile. Due to Corollary 1, we can restrict
attention to games with a single efficient action. Let a¯ denote this unique efficient action.
Our first result shows that each incumbent type plays efficiently when meeting itself.
Theorem 2. Let (µ∗, b∗)be an NSC of a generic game and let θ ∈ C (µ∗). Then pi (bθ (θ) , bθ (θ)) = (a¯, a¯).
The outline of the proof is as follows (the formal proof is in Appendix A.3). In order to obtain a contradiction
assume that there exists an incumbent that does not play a¯. Let θ¯ ∈ C (µ∗) be the type with the highest cognitive
level, among the types that do not play a¯ against themselves. Let uˆ be a utility function which is identical to
uθ¯ except that: (1) the payoff of the outcome (a¯, a¯) is increased by the minimal amount required to make it a
best reply to itself, and (2) the payoffs of some other outcome is altered slightly (to ensure uˆ is not already an
incumbent) in a way that does not force θˆ to behave differently from θ¯. Suppose a mutant of type θˆ =
(
θˆ, nθ¯
)
enters. Consider a focal post-entry configuration in which the mutants mimic the play of the incumbent θ¯ in
all matches except: (1) they play the efficient profile (a¯, a¯) among themselves (which yields a higher payoff than
what θ¯ achieves when being matched against θ′), and (2) when the mutant faces a higher type they either play
(a¯, a¯) or the same deception equilibrium that the higher type plays against θ¯. It follows that the mutant θˆ earns
a strictly higher payoff than θ¯ against θˆ , and a weakly higher fitness than type θ¯ against all other types. Thus
the the mutants strictly outperform the incumbents, which contradicts (µ∗, b∗)being an NSC.
The following Theorem shows that any two types play efficiently when meeting each other. The intuition is
that populations in which within-type matchings yields higher payoff (p¯i according to Theorem 2) than out-group
matchings (an average payoff of less than p¯i) are dynamically unstable: a slight increase in a group’s frequency
would increase its fitness and would take the population away from the initial state.
Theorem 3. Let (µ∗, b∗) be an NSC of a generic game, and let θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗). Then bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ) = a¯.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exist two types θj , θk ∈ C (µ∗), θj 6= θk, such that bθ (θ′) 6= a¯ 6= bθ′ (θ) .
This implies that 0.5 · (pi (bθj (θk) , bθk (θj))+ pi (bθk (θj) , bθj (θk))) < p¯i. The fact that (µ∗, b∗) is an NSC implies
that µ∗ is an NSS in the type game Γ(µ∗,b∗). Let B be the payoff matrix of the type game Γ(µ∗,b∗) and let
n = |C (µ∗)|. It is well known (e.g., Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988, Exercise 6.4.3 and Hofbauer (2011, pp. 1-2))
that an interior strategy profile of a normal form game can be an NSS only if the payoff matrix is negative
semi-definite with respect to the tangent space, i.e. only if x ·Bx ≤ 0 for each x ∈ Rn such that ∑i xi = 0.
Assume without loss of generality that type θj (θk) is represented by the jth (kth) row of the matrix B. Let
the column vector x be defined as follows:
x (i) =

1 i = j
−1 i = k
0 i 6= j, k
.
That is the vector x has all entries equal to zero, except the jth entry which is equal to 1, and the kth entry
which is equal to −1. We have
x ·Bx = Bjj −Bjk −Bjk +Bkk
= a¯− knθj + a¯− knθk −
(
pi
(
bθj (θk) , bθk (θj)
)− knθj + pi (bθk (θj) , bθj (θk))− knθk)
= 2 · a¯− (pi (bθj (θk) , bθk (θj))+ pi (bθk (θj) , bθj (θk))) > 0.
Thus B is not negative semi-definite.
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Note that that in a generic game any pure action is either a strict equilibrium, or not a best reply to itself.
Combining the results of this section with the above charachterisation of pure NSCs yields the following corollary,
which fully characterises the NSCs of generic games.
Corollary 3. Let G be a generic game.
1. If G admits an efficient action a¯ that is also a Nash equilibrium, then there is a pure NSC in which all types
(i) have cognitive level one, and (ii) always play a¯. Converesely, if k2 < δ, then this NSC is essentially
unique: any NSC must satisfy both properties (i) and (ii).
2. Otherwise, the game does not admit any NSC.
4.5 Non-pure NSCs in non-Generic Games
The previous two subsections fully characterized (i) pure NSCs and (ii) NSCs in generic games. In this section we
analyse non-pure NCSs in non-generic games. Non-generic games may be of interest in various setups, such as:
(1) normal-form representation of generic extensive-form games (the induced matrix is typically non-generic), and
(2) special interesting families of games, such as zero-sum games. Unlike generic games, non-generic games can
admit (non-pure) NSCs with multiple cognitive level and non-Nash behavior. To demonstrate this we consider
the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, with the payoff matrix
R P S
R 0, 0 −1, 1 1,−1
P 1,−1 0, 0 −1, 1
S −1, 1 1,−1 0, 0
.
The following result shows that, under mild assumptions on the cognitive costs function, this game admits an
NSC in which all players have the same materialistic preferences, but players of different cognitive levels co-exist,
and non-Nash profiles are played in all matches of two individuals of different cognitive levels. More precisely,
when individuals of different cognitive levels meet, the higher level individual deceives the lower level individual
to take a pure action that the higher level individual then best responds to. Thus the higher level individual
earns 1 and her opponent earns −1. Individuals of the same cognitive level play the unique Nash equilibrium.
This means that higher-level types will obtain the payoff 1 more often than lower-level types, and lower-level
types will obtain the payoff −1 more often than higher-level types. In the NSC this payoff difference is offset
exactly by the higher cognitive cost paid by higher types. Moreover, the cognitive cost is increasing so that at
some point the cost of cognition outweighs any payoff differences that may arise from the underlying game. This
implies that there is an upper bound on the cognitive sophistication in the population.
Proposition 3. Let G be a Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Let upi denote the (materialistic) preference such that
upi (a, a′) = pi (a, a′) for all profiles (a, a′). Suppose that the marginal cognitive cost is small but non-vanishing,
so that (a) there is an N such that kN ≤ 2 < kN+1, and (b) it holds that 1 > kn+1 − kn for all n ≤ N .10 There
exists an NSC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(upi, n)}Nn=1, and µ∗ is mixed (i.e. |C (µ∗)| > 1). The behaviour of
the incumbent types is as follows: if the individuals in a match are of different cognitive level, then the higher
level plays Paper and the lower level plays Rock; if both individuals in a match are of the same cognitive level,
then they both play the unique nash equilibrium (i.e. randomise uniformly over the three actions).
Appendix C.2 contains a formal proof of this result an relates it to a similar construction in Conlisk (2001).
10If we define δ as in (1) then we have δ = 1, in Proposition 3. Thus the condition that δ > kn+1 − kn for all n in Proposition 3,
may be viewed as an extension of the condition k2 < δ in Proposition 1.
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5 Non-Observability Among Cognitive Equals
The main model assumes that types with equal levels can observe each others preferences. In this section we
present an alternative “tie-breaking rule” according to which players are unable to observe the preferences of an
opponent with the same cognitive level.
5.1 Changes to the Baseline Model
Play Between Types with Equal Cognitive Levels. If two individuals of the same cognitive level are
matched to play, then they play a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game in which each player only knows
that his opponent has the same cognitive level (but he cannot observe his opponent’s preferences). Given a
distribution of types µ, we say that n ∈ projNC (µ) if there exists a type (u, n) ∈ C (µ). Given a distribution
µ and n ∈ projNC (µ), let Θn denote the set of types with level n, and let µn denote the distribution of types
conditional on having cognitive level n:
µn (u, n) =
µ (u, n)∑
(u′,n)∈C(µ) µ (u′, n)
.
Given distribution µ and n ∈ projNC (µ), a vector of action profiles (σθ)θ∈Θn is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of
the game between types with level n, if each player best-reply to the aggregate behavior of players with the
same cognitive level. Let BNE (n) ⊆ (∆A)|Θn| be the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria of the game induced by the
interactions between players with cognitive level n, i.e.
BNE (n) =
{
(σθ)θ∈Θn ∈ (∆A)
|Θn| : ∀σ(u,n) ∈ Θn, σ(u,n) ∈ argmaxσ∈∆(A)
∑
θ∈Θn
µn (θ) · u (σ, σθ)
}
.
The play among types with equal levels is analogous to the play of all types in the unobservable case of Dekel
et al. (2007, Section 4). Players with different cognitive levels play deception equilibria as in the baseline model.
Redefining Configurations. We redefine the notion of a configuration as follows:
Definition 11. A configuration is a pair (µ, b) where µ ∈ ∆ (U) is a type distribution, and b : C (µ)×C (µ) −→
∆ (A) is a behaviour policy such that:
1. Players play the same against all opponents with the same level, i.e. for each n ∈ projNC (µ), if θ, θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θn
then bθ (θ′) = bθ (θ′′).
2. Types with the same level play a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, i.e. for each n ∈ projNC (µ)(
(bθ (θ))θ∈Θn
) ∈ BNE (n) .
3. Types with different levels play deception equilibria, i.e. for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ) :
nθ > nθ′ =⇒ (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) ∈ DE (θ, θ′) .
Redefining NSC. Unlike in the baseline model, focal configurations (in which the incumbents keep their pre-
entry play) do not always exist. Accordingly, we modify the definition NSC slightly to require the existence of a
focal configuration for any given distribution of mutants.11 Formally:
11All the results remain the same if one only requires δ-focality a` la Dekel et al. (2007)
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Definition 12. A configuration (µ, b) is a neutrally stable configuration (NSC), if for every µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ), there
is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯), it holds that; (1) there exists a focal configuration (µ˜, b˜), where
µ˜ = (1− ε) · µ+ ε · µ′, and (2) for each such focal configuration (µ˜, b˜), the distribution µ is an NSS in the type
game Γ(µ˜,b˜).
5.2 Results
The following simple results show that with non-observable equals, it is no longer the case that stable outcomes
must be efficient. The first result shows that any strict Nash equilibrium (even non-efficient) is the outcome of
a pure NSC. The argument is similar to Dekel et al. (2007, Proposition 5-b) and is presented briefly.
Proposition 4. Let a∗ ∈ A be a strict Nash equilibrium. Then there exists a pure NSC (µ, a∗) where µ contains
a single type (1, u∗) such that a is a strictly dominant action given the utility function u∗.
Proof. Observe that the incumbents always play a∗ in any focal configuration (and that such focal configuration
always exist). The fact that a∗ is a strict equilibrium implies that any mutant who does not always play a∗
against the incumbents is strictly outperform if the mutants are sufficiently rare. If the mutant type has level
one, it implies that he must always play a∗ also against mutants, and that it achieves the same payoff as the
incumbents. If the mutant has higher cognitive level, then if the mutants are sufficiently rare the higher cognitive
cost implies that it is strictly outperformed.
The next result shows that players with the highest type must play a Nash equilibrium (of the underlying
game) among themselves.The argument is similar to Dekel et al. (2007, Proposition 5-a) and is presented briefly.
Claim 2. Let (µ∗, b∗) be an NSC and let n¯ be the highest cognitive level. The action profile (bθ (θ))θ∈Θn¯ is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the fitness game. That is:
∀θ∗ ∈ Θn¯, bθ∗ (θ∗) ∈ argmaxσ∈∆(A)
∑
θ∈Θn
µn (θ) · pi (σ, bθ (θ)) .
Proof. Assume to the contrary the the highest types do not play a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the fitness game.
Let θ¯ ∈ Θn¯ be one such type. That is
bθ∗ (θ∗) /∈ argmaxσ∈∆(A)
∑
θ∈Θn
µn (θ) · pi (σ, bθ (θ)) .
Let θ′ = (u′, n¯) be a mutant type which is indifferent between any two outcomes, and which mimics the play of
θ∗ against lower types, while best-replying in the induced fitness game between the highest types. Such a mutant
type would strictly outperform the incumbent θ¯ in any focal configuration.
6 Type-Interdependent Preferences
In this section we describe an extension of our baseline model, such that the preferences may depend not only
on action profiles, but also on the opponent’s type.
6.1 Changes to the Baseline Model
We briefly describe how to amend the model to handle type-interdependent preferences. Our construction is
similar to that of Herold & Kuzmics (2009).
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When the preferences of a type depend on the opponent’s type, we can no longer work with the set of all
possible preferences, because it would create problems of circularity and cardinality.12 Instead, we must restrict
attention to a pre-specified set of feasible preferences. We begin by defining ΘID as an arbitrary set of labels.
Each label is a pair θ = (u, n) ∈ ΘID, where n ∈ N and u is a type-interdependent utility function that depends
on the played action profile as well as the opponent’s label,
u : A×A×ΘID → R.
Each label θ = (u, n) may now be interpreted as a type. The definition of u extends to mixed actions in the
obvious way. We use the label u also to describe its associated utility function u. Thus u (σ, σ′, θ′) denotes the
subjective payoff that a player with preferences u earns when she plays strategy σ against an opponent with type
θ′ who plays strategy σ′.
Let UID denote the set of all preferences that are part of some type in ΘID, i.e. UID = {u : ∃n ∈ N
s.t. (u, n) ∈ ΘID}. For each type-neutral preference u ∈ U we can define an equivalent type-interdependent
preference u ∈ UID, which is independent of the opponent’s type; that is, u′ (σ, σ′, θ′) = u′′ (σ, σ′, θ′′) for each
u′, u′′ ∈ UID. Let UN denote the set of all such type-interdependent versions of the type-neutral preferences of
the baseline model. All of our results allow, but do not require, that UN ⊆ UID.
Next, we amend the definitions of Nash equilibrium, undominated strategies, and deception equilibrium. The
best-reply correspondence now takes both strategies and types as arguments: BRu (σ′, θ′) = arg maxσ∈∆(A) u (σ, σ′, θ′).
Accordingly we adjust the definition of the set of Nash equilibria,
NE (θ, θ′) = {(σ, σ′) ∈ ∆ (A)×∆ (A) : σ ∈ BRu (σ′, θ′) and σ′ ∈ BRu′ (σ, θ)} ,
and the set of undominated strategies
Σ (θ) = {σ ∈ ∆ (A) : there exists σ′ ∈ ∆ (A) and θ′ ∈ ΘID such that σ ∈ BRu (σ′, θ′)} .
Finally, we adapt the definition of deception equilibrium. Given two types θ, θ′ with nθ > nθ′ , a strategy profile
(σ˜, σ˜′) is a deception equilibrium if
(σ˜, σ˜′) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A),σ′∈Σ(θ′)
uθ (σ, σ′, θ′) .
Let DE (θ, θ′) be the set of all such deception equilibria. The rest of our model remains unchanged.
6.2 Pure Maxmin and Minimal Fitness
The pure maxmin and minmax values give a minimal bound to the fitness of an NSC. Given a game G = (A, pi) ,
define M(M¯) as its pure maxmin (minmax) value:
M = max
a1∈A
min
a2∈A
pi (a1, a2) ,
M = min
a2∈A
max
a1∈A
pi (a1, a2) .
12The circularity comes from the fact that each type contains a preferences component, which is identified with a utility function
defined over types (and action profiles). To see that this creates a problem if the set of types is unrestricted, let Θ∗ be the set of
types and suppose that the corresponding set of preferences, U∗, contains all mappings u : A × A × Θ∗ → R. The cardinality of
this set is |U | · |Θ∗|, but if U∗ is indeed the set of all mappings u : A × A × Θ∗ → R, then we must have |U∗| = |U | · |Θ∗|. Since
|Θ∗| ≥ |U∗| this is a contradiction. See also footnote 10 in Herold & Kuzmics (2009).
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The pure maxmin value M
¯
is the minimal fitness payoff a player can guarantee herself in the sequential game in
which she plays first, and the opponent replies in an arbitrary way (i.e. not necessarily in a way that maximizes
the opponent’s fitness.) The pure minmax value M is the minimal fitness payoff a player can guarantee herself in
the sequential game in which her opponent plays first an arbitrary action, and she best-replies to the opponent’s
pure action. It is immediate that M ≤ M, and that the minmax value in mixed actions is between these two
values.
Let aM
¯
be a maxmin action of a player; an action aM
¯
guarantees that the player’s payoff is at least M
¯
,
aM ∈ arg max
a1∈A
min
a2∈A
pi (a1, a2) .
The following simple lemma (which holds also in the baseline model with type-neutral preferences) shows that
the maxmin value is a lower bound on the fitness payoff obtained in an NSC. The intuition is that if the payoff
is lower, then a mutant of cognitive level 1, with preferences such that the maxmin action aM is dominant, will
outperform the incumbents.
Definition 13. Given a pure action a∗ ∈ A, let ua∗ ∈ UN be the (type-neutral) preferences in which the player
obtains a payoff of 1 if she plays a∗ and a payoff of 0 otherwise (i.e. a∗ is a dominant action regardless of the
opponent’s preferences).
Proposition 5. Assume that (uaM , 1) ∈ ΘID. Let (µ, b) be an NSC. Then Π (µ, b) ≥M .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that Π (µ, b) < M . Consider a monomorphic group of mutants with type (uaM , 1) .
The fact that aM is a maxmin action implies that
pi(uaM ,1)
((
µ˜, b˜
)) ≥M
in any post-entry configuration. Furthermore, due to continuity it holds that Πθ
(
µ˜, b˜
)
< M for any θ ∈ C (µ)
in all sufficiently close focal post-entry configuration. This contradicts µ being an NSS in Γ(µ˜,b˜), and thus it
contradicts (µ, b) being an NSC.
6.3 Characterisation of Pure Stable Configurations
In this subsection we show that, essentially, a pure action can be an outcome of an ESC if and only if it is a Nash
equilibrium that yields each player a payoff above her minmax/maxmin value.
We first adapt Propositions 1-1 to the current setup. Specifically, we show that if (µ∗, a∗) is a pure NSC,
then: (1) all incumbents have the same cognitive level, and (2) a∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, provided
that the marginal cognitive costs are sufficiently small (smaller than δ, as defined in (1)).
Proposition 6. Let (µ∗, a∗) be a pure NSC. Then:
1. θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) ⇒nθ = nθ′ .
2. If for each n kn+1 − kn < δ, then a∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium (in fitness payoffs).
Proof.
1. Since all players earn the same game payoff of pi (a∗, a∗) , they must also incur the same cognitive cost, or
else the fitness of the different incumbent types would not be balanced (which contradicts (µ, a∗) being an
NSC).
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2. Assume to the contrary that there exist a′ ∈ A such that pi (a′, a∗) > pi (a∗, a∗). Assume without loss
of generality that a′ is a best reply against a∗ (in fitness terms). By part (i) all the incumbents have
cognitive level n. Consider a monomorphic group of mutants θ′ = (pi, n+ 1). There is a focal post-entry
configuration in which the mutants play the deception equilibrium (a′, a∗) against the incumbents. Observe
that the mutants obtain a strictly higher payoff when facing an incumbent, than what two incumbents earn
against each other:
pi (a′, a∗)− (kn+1 − kn) > pi (a′, a∗)− δ ≥ pi (a∗, a∗) .
This implies that if the mutants are sufficiently rare, they outperform the incumbents in the post-entry
focal configuration.
Let aM¯ be a minmax action, i.e. an action that guarantees that the opponent’s payoff is at most M¯ ;
aM¯ ∈ arg min
a2∈A
max
a1∈A
pi (a1, a2) .
Definition 14. Given any two actions a˜, a˜′ ∈ A, let ua˜a˜′ be the discriminating preferences defined by the following
utility function: For all a′,
ua˜a˜′ (a, a′, θ′) =

1 if uθ′ = ua˜a˜′ and a = a˜
1 if uθ′ 6= ua˜a˜′ and a = a˜′
0 otherwise
.
In words, the preferences ua˜a˜′ are such that a˜ is a dominant action against an opponent with the same
preferences, and a˜′ is the dominant action against all other opponents.
The following result shows that any action a∗ that is both a symmetric Nash equilibrium and yields a payoff
above the minmax value can be implemented as the unique pure outcome of an ESC. (Recall that θ is used to
denote that probability distribution µ puts all weight on θ, i.e. µ (θ) = 1.)
Proposition 7. Assume that
(
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
∈ ΘID. If action a∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium and pi (a∗, a∗) > M,
then
((
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
, a∗
)
is an ESC.
Proof. Suppose that all incumbents are of type
(
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
. Note that in all focal post-entry configurations the
incumbent
(
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
always plays either a∗ or aM¯ . Against a mutant (θ, 1) with cognitive level 1, an incumbent
plays a∗ if and only if u (θ) = ua∗aM¯ . The fact that pi (a
∗, a∗) > M implies that any mutant θ 6=
(
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
earns
a strictly lower payoff against the incumbents in any post-entry configuration. As a result, if the frequency of
mutants is sufficiently small, then they are strictly outperformed. Against a mutant (θ, n) with cognitive level
n > 1, an incumbent may play either a∗ or aM¯ . Since a∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium and pi (a∗, a∗) > M the
mutants earn at most pi (a∗, a∗) in matches against incumbents. Consequently, as the fraction of mutants vanishes
the average fitness of mutants is weakly less than pi (a∗, a∗) − kn, and the average fitness of the incumbents is
pi (a∗, a∗). Since k is strictly increasing this implies that
((
ua∗aM¯ , 1
)
, a∗
)
is an ESC.
The results of this section imply the following corollary, which characterises pure outcomes of stable configu-
rations in terms of being Nash equilibria that yield payoffs above the pure maxmin/minmax values.
Corollary 4.
1. If action a∗ is a Nash equilibrium and pi (a∗, a∗) > M¯, then it is the pure outcome of an ESC.
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2. If action a∗ is a pure outcome of an NSC and ∀n, kn+1− kn < δ, then a∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium
and pi (a∗, a∗) ≥M.
6.4 Application: In-Group Cooperation and Out-Group Exploitation
The following table represents a family of Hawk-Dove games. When both players play D (Dove) they earn 1
each and when they both play H (Hawk) they earn 0. When a player plays H against an opponent playing D,
she obtains an additional gain of g > 0 and the opponent incurs a loss of l ∈ (0, 1).
H D
H 0, 0 1 + g, 1− l
D 1− l, 1 + g 1, 1
. (2)
It is natural to think of mutual play of D as the cooperative outcome. We define preferences that induce players
to cooperate with their own kind and to seek to exploit those who are not of their own kind.
Definition 15. Let un denote the preferences such that:
(1) If uθ′ = un and nθ′ = n then un (D, a′, θ′) = 1 and un (H, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
(2) If uθ′ 6= un or nθ′ 6= n then un (H, a′, θ′) = 1 and un (D, a′, θ′) = 0 for all a′.
Thus, facing someone who is of the same type, an individual with un-preferences strictly prefers cooperation,
in the sense of playing D. When facing someone who is not of the same type, an individual with un-preferences
prefers the exploitative outcome (H,D), and after that she prefers the destructive outcome (H,H) over the
remaining outcomes.
Under the assumption that g > l and that the marginal cognitive costs are sufficiently small (but non-
vanishing), we construct an ESC in which only individuals with preferences from {ui}∞i=1 are present. Individuals
of different cognitive levels co-exist, and non-Nash profiles are played in all matches between equals. When
individuals of the same level meet, they play mutual cooperation (D,D). When individuals of different levels
meet, the higher level plays H and the lower level plays D. The gain from obtaining the high payoff of 1 + g
against lower types is exactly compensated by the higher cognitive costs. In contrast, if g < l then the game
does not admit this kind of stable configuration.
Proposition 8. Let G be the game represented in (2), where g > 0 and l ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that the marginal
cognitive cost is small but non-vanishing, so that (a) there is an N such that kN ≤ l+ g < kN+1, and (b) it holds
that g > kn+1 − kn for all n ≤ N .
(i) If g > l then there exists an ESC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(un, n)}Nn=1, and µ∗ is mixed (i.e.
|C (µ∗)| > 1). The behaviour of the incumbents is as follows: if the individuals in a match are of different
cognitive levels, then the higher level plays H and the lower level plays D; if both individuals in a match are of
the same cognitive level, then they both play D.
(ii) If g = l then there exists an NSC with the above properties.
(iii) If g < l then there does not exist any NSC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(un, n)}∞n=1.
The formal proof is presented in Appendix C.3.
7 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
We have developed a model in which preferences co-evolve with the ability to detect others’ preferences and
misrepresent one’s own preferences. We do this by allowing for heterogeneity with respect to costly cognitive
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ability. The assumption of an exogenously-given level of observability of the opponent’s preferences, which
has characterised the indirect evolutionary approach so far, is replaced by a Machiavellian notion of deception
equilibrium, which endogenously determines what each player observes.
Only one, seemingly small, aspect of the observability structure remains exogenous: the observability among
players with equal cognitive levels. Our main results surprisingly shows that a “grain” of perfect observability
among equals is enough to imply that only efficient configurations can be stable. However, we later show that
this result crucially depend on the “tie-breaking” rule. If we assume that players with equal levels cannot observe
each other’s preferences, then stable configurations do not have to be efficient (instead they are closely related
to Nash equilibria of the underlying games). We leave for future research a model that will endogenize also the
observability among equals.
Our model assumes a very powerful form of deception. This allows us to derive sharp results that clearly
demonstrate effects of endogenising observation, and introducing deception. We expect similar but weaker effects
to be present when deception takes a weaker form. Specifically, we think that the “Bayesian” deception is an
interesting model for future research: each incumbent type is associated with a signal, agents with high cognitive
levels can mimic the signals of types with lower cognitive levels, and agents maximise their preferences given the
received signals and the correct Bayesian inference about the opponent’s type.
In a companion paper (Heller & Mohlin, 2014) we study environments in which players are randomly matched,
and make inferences about the opponent’s type by observing her past behaviour (rather than observing the type
directly as is standard in the “indirect evolutionary approach”). In future research, it would be interesting to
combine both approaches and allow the observation of the past behaviour to be influenced by deception.
Most papers taking the indirect evolutionary approach study the stability of preferences defined over material
outcomes. Moreover, it is common to restrict attention to some parameterised class of such preferences. Since
we study preferences defined on the more abstract level of action profiles (or the joint set of action profiles and
opponent’s types in the case of type-interdependent preferences) we do not make predictions about whether some
particular kind of preferences over material outcomes, from a particular family of utility functions, will be stable
or not. It would be interesting to extend our model to such classes of preferences. Furthermore, with preferences
defined over material outcomes it would be possible to study co-evolution of preferences and deception not only
in isolated games, but also when individuals play many different games using the same preferences. We hope to
come back to these questions and we invite others to employ and modify our framework in these directions.
A Proofs
A.1 Preliminaries
This subsection section contains notation and definitions that will be used in the following proofs.
A generous action is an action such that if played by the opponent, it allows a player to achieve the maximal
fitness payoff. Formally:
Definition 16. Action ag ∈ A is generous, if there exists an a ∈ A such that pi (a, ag) ≥ pi (a′, a′′) for all
a′, a′′ ∈ A.
Fix a generous action ag ∈ A of the game G. A second-best generous action is an action such that if played
by the opponent, it allows a player to achieve the maximal fitness payoff under the constraint that the opponent
is not allowed to play the generous action ag. Formally:
Definition 17. Action ag2 ∈ A is second-best generous, conditional on ag ∈ A being first best generous, if there
exists a ∈ A such that pi (a, ag2) ≥ pi (a′, a′′) for allla′, a′′ ∈ A such that a′′ 6= ag.
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Fix a generous action ag ∈ A, and fix a second-best generous action ag2 ∈ A, conditional on ag ∈ A being
first best generous. For each α ≥ β ≥ 0, let uα,β be the following utility function:
uα,β (a, a′) =

α a′ = ag
β a′ = ag2
0 otherwise
.
Observe that such a utility functionuα,β satisfies:
1. Indifference - the utility functiononly depends on the opponent’s action; i.e., the player is indifferent between
any two of his own actions.
2. Pro-generosity - the utility is highest (second-highest) if the opponent plays the (second-best) generous
action, and lowest otherwise.
Let UGI = {uα,β |α ≥ β ≥ 0} be the family of all such preferences, called pro-generosity indifferent preferences.
Note that Ug includes a continuum of different utilities (under the assumption that G includes at least three
actions). Thus for any set of incumbent types we can always find a utility function in Ug which is does not belong
to any of the current incumbents.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 (Behaviour of the Highest Types)
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Assume to the contrary that pi
(
bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯
(
θ¯
))
< p¯i. (Note that the definition of p¯i implies that the opposite
inequality is impossible). Let a1, a2 ∈ A be any two actions such that (a1, a2) is an efficient action profile,
i.e. 0.5 · (pi (a1, a2) + pi (a1, a2)) = p¯i. Let θ1, θ2 be two types that satisfy: (1) the types are not incumbents;
θ1, θ2 /∈ C (µ∗), (2) both types have the highest incumbent cognitive level; nθ1 = nθ2 = n¯, and (3) both types
have different pro-generosity indifferent preferences; uθ1 , uθ2 ∈ UGI and uθ1 6= uθ2 . Let µ′ be the distribution
that assigns mass 0.5 to each of these types. The post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′. Let the
post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality; b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) for each incumbent pair θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches between mutants and incumbents of lower types, behaviour is such that the mutants maximize
their fitness;
(
b˜θi (θ′) , b˜θ′ (θi)
) ∈ FMDE (θi, θ′) for each i ∈ {1, 2} and θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ < n¯.
3. In matches between mutants and incumbents of the highest type, the mutants mimick θ¯ and the higher
types play the same way they play against θ¯;
(
b˜θi (θ′) , b˜θ′ (θi)
)
=
(
bθ¯ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ¯
))
, for each i ∈ {1, 2} and
θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ = n¯.
4. Two mutants of different types play efficiently when meeting each other; b˜θi (θj) = ai for each i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}.
5. Two mutants of the same type play like θ¯ plays against itself, when meeting each other;b˜θi (θi) = bθ¯
(
θ¯
)
for
each i ∈ {1, 2}.
In virtue of point 1 the construction
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)). By point 2 the mutants
θ1 and θ2 earn weakly more than θ¯ against lower types. By point 3 the mutants earn exactly the same as θ¯
aginst all the highest incumbent types (including θ¯). By 4 and 5 the mutants on average earn strictly more than
θ¯ against the mutants. In total average fitness earned by θ1 and θ2 is strictly higher than that of θ¯, against a
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population who follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the population game
Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies
that that µ∗ is not an NSC.
Remark 4. In this proof the mutants only outperform the incumbents on average. This allows for the possibility
that one mutant earns strictly less than θ¯, while the other mutant earns strictly more than θ¯. That is enough
to prove the desired result. However, we could also have proved our result with a construction involving three
different mutants θ1, θ2, θ3 , each of which earns strictly more than θ¯ in the post-entry configuration. This would
be achieved if the three mutant types are equally frequent, and any two mutants of the same type play like θ¯
plays against itself (point 5 above), but play as follows when facing another mutant: (i) mutant θ1 plays a1
against θ2 and a2 against θ3, (ii) mutant θ2 plays a1 against θ3 and a2 against θ1, and (iii) mutant θ3 plays a1
against θ1 and a2 against θ2.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 1.2
Assume to the contrary that
((
bθ¯ (θ) , bθ
(
θ¯
))) 6∈ FMDE (θ¯, θ). Let θˆ be a type that satisfies: (1) not being an
incumbent; θˆ /∈ C (µ∗), (2) having the highest incumbent cognitive level; nθˆ = n¯, and (3) having pro-generosity
indifferent preferences; uθˆ ∈ UGI . Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass one to type θˆ. The post-entry
type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′. Let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality; b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches between mutants and incumbents of lower types, behaviour is such that the mutants maximize
their fitness;
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ < n¯.
3. In matches between mutants and incumbents of the highest type, the mutant mimicks θ¯ and the higher
types play the same way they play against θ¯;
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bθ¯ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ¯
))
, for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗)
with nθ′ = n¯.
Note that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)), and that θˆ obtains a strictly higher fitness than θ¯
against a population who follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the population
game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in Γ(µ˜,b˜), which
implies that that µ∗ is not an NSC.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 1.3
Assume to the contrary that pi
(
bθ
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯ (θ)
)
> p¯i, which immediately implies that pi
(
bθ¯ (θ) , bθ
(
θ¯
))
< p¯i. Let θˆ
be a type that satisfies: (1) not being an incumbent; θˆ /∈ C (µ∗), (2) having the highest incumbent cognitive level;
nθˆ = n¯, and (3) having pro-generosity indifferent preferences; uθˆ ∈ UGI . Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns
mass one to type θˆ. The post-entry type distribution is µ˜ = (1− ) · µ +  · µ′. Let the post-entry behaviour
policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality; b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches between mutants and incumbents of lower types, behaviour is such that the mutants maximize
their fitness;
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
for each θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) with nθ′ < n¯.
3. In a match between a mutant θˆ and the incumbent θ¯, the mutant mimicks θ, and the incumbent θ¯ plays
the same way it plays against θ;
(
b˜θˆ
(
θ¯
)
, b˜θ¯
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bθ
(
θ¯
)
, bθ¯ (θ)
)
.
24
4. θˆ plays against itself the same way θ¯ plays against itself;
(
b˜θˆ
(
θˆ
)
, b˜θˆ
(
θˆ
))
=
(
b˜θ¯
(
θ¯
)
, b˜θ¯
(
θ¯
))
, and
5. θˆ mimics θ¯ against all other highest types, and these higher types play against θˆ the same as they play
against θ¯;
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bθ¯ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ¯
))
for each θ′ 6= θ¯ with nθ′ = n¯.
Note that
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)). By point 2 the mutant θˆ earns weakly more
than θ¯ against lower types. By point 3 (and Theorem 1.1) the mutants earn strictly more than θ¯ against type θ¯.
By 3 and 4 (and Theorem 1.1 and ) the mutant earns strictly more than θ¯ against the mutant. By 5 earns the
same as θ¯ against all other types. In total average fitness earned by θˆ is strictly higher than that of θ¯, against a
population who follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the population game
Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS, in Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies
that that µ∗ is not an NSC.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2 (Each Type Plays Efficiently Against Itself)
We begin by proving a lemma.
Lemma 1. If (σ1, σ2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2) then there exist actions a1, a′1 ∈ supp (σ1) and a2, a′2 ∈ supp (σ2) such
that:(a1, a2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2), and (a′1, a′2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2), with pi (a1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2), and pi (a′1, a′2) ≤ pi (σ1, σ2).
Proof. Note that for any mixed deception equilibrium (σ1, σ2), and any action a ∈ supp (σ2), the profile (σ1, a)
is also a deception equilibrium (because othewise the deceiver would not induce the decieved party to take a
mixed action that puts positive weight on a). It follows that there are actions actions a2, a′2 ∈ supp (σ2) such that
(σ1, a2) and (σ1, a′2) are deception equilibria, with pi (σ1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2) and pi (σ1, a′2) ≤ pi (σ1, σ2). Furthermore,
if (σ1, a2) and (σ1, a′2) are deception equilibria then, for any action a ∈ supp (σ1), the profiles (a, a2) and (a, a′2)
are also deception equilibria, with pi (σ1, a2) = pi (a, a2) and pi (σ1, a′2) = pi (a, a′2). Hence there are actions
a1, a
′
1 ∈ supp (σ1) such that (a1, a2) and (a′1, a′2) are deception equilibria, with pi (a1, a2) = pi (σ1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2),
and pi (a1, a′2) = pi (σ1, a′2) ≤ pi (σ1, σ2).
We are now able to prove Theorem 2. Assume to the contrary that there exists an incumbent that does not
play a¯ (the unique efficient action) against itself. (From Theorem 1.1 we know that θ˚ cannot be of the highest
type in the population, denoted n¯ above.) Let θ˚ ∈ C (µ∗) be the type with the highest cognitive level, among
those types who do not play a¯ against themselves. That is,
(
bθ˚
(
θ˚
)
, bθ˚
(
θ˚
))
6= (a¯, a¯), and if nθ > nθ˚, then
(bθ (θ) , bθ (θ)) = (a¯, a¯).
We consider a mutant θˆ =
(
nθ˚, uˆ
)
/∈ C (µ∗) . If Σ (uθ˚) = ∆, then we let uˆ ∈ UGI be such that θˆ = (nθ˚, uˆ) /∈
C (µ∗). If Σ
(
uθ˚
) 6= ∆, then we fix a dominated action a ∈ A\Σ (uθ˚), and let uˆ be defined as follows:
uˆ (a, a′) =

maxa∈A
(
uθ˚ (a, a¯)
)
a = a′ = a¯
uθ˚ (a, a′)− βa′ a = a and a′ 6= a¯
uθ˚ (a, a′) otherwise
,
where each βa′ ≥ 0 is chosen such that θˆ =
(
nθ˚, uˆ
)
/∈ C (µ∗). That is, if Σ (uθ˚) 6= ∆, then the utility function uˆ
is constructed from the utility function uθ˚ by arbitrarily lowering the payoff of some of the outcomes associated
with the (already) dominated action a and which do not involve action a¯, while increasing the payoff of the
outcome (a¯, a¯) by the minimal amount that make it a best reply to itself. Note that this definition of uˆ is valid
also for the case of a¯ = a. It follows that a ∈ Σ (uθ˚) ∪ {a¯} if and only if a ∈ Σ (uˆ). (To see this, note that if
Σ
(
uθ˚
) 6= ∆ and a = a¯, then Σ (uˆ) = Σ (uθ˚) ∪ {a¯}. Otherwise Σ (uˆ) = Σ (uθ˚).) Thus, θˆ can be induced to play
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exactly the same pure actions as θ˚, unless a¯ = a, in which case θˆ can be induced to play a¯ in addition to all
actions that θ˚ can be induced to play.)
Let µ′ be the distribution that assigns mass one to type
(
nθ˚, uˆ
)
. Let the post-entry type distribution be
µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′, and let the post-entry behaviour policy b˜ be defined as follows:
1. Behaviour among incumbents respects focality; b˜θ (θ′) = bθ (θ′) for each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ∗).
2. In matches between the mutant type θˆ and any lower type θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) (with nθ′ < nθˆ), we distinguish two
cases.
(a) Suppose that Σ
(
uθ˚
)
= ∆. In this case let
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
∈ FMDE
(
θˆ, θ′
)
.
(b) Suppose that Σ
(
uθ˚
) 6= ∆. In this case let (b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′ (θˆ)) = (a1, a2), for some (a1, a2) ∈ DE (θ˚, θ′)
such that pi (a1, a2) ≥ pi
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
. By lemma XXX insert ref to lemma above XXX
above such a profile (a1, a2) exists.
3. If (σ1, σ2) ∈ DE (θ1, θ2) then there exist actions a1 ∈ supp (σ1) and a2 ∈ supp (σ2) such that (a1, a2) ∈
DE (θ1, θ2) andpi (a1, a2) ≥ pi (σ1, σ2)
4. In matches between the mutant type θˆ and any incumbent type θ′ with same level, the mutant θˆ mimics
θ˚, and the incumbent θ′ treats the mutant θˆ like the incumbent θ˚;
(
b˜θˆ (θ′) , b˜θ′
(
θˆ
))
=
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
if
nθ′ = nθ˚ and θ′ 6= θˆ.
5. The mutant plays efficiently when meeting itself; b˜θˆ
(
θˆ
)
= a¯.
6. In matches between the mutant type θˆ and any higher type θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) (with nθ′ > nθˆ), we distinguish
two cases. Pick a profile (a1, a2) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θ˚
)
, such that pi (a2, a1) ≥ pi
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
. By lemma XXX
insert ref to lemma above XXX above such a profile (a1, a2) exists. Moreover, (since a ∈ Σ
(
uθ˚
)∪ {a¯}
if and only if a ∈ Σ (uˆ)) it is either the case that (a1, a2) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θˆ
)
or that a2 = a¯. In the latter case,
if a2 = a¯, then (a¯, a¯) ∈ DE
(
θ′, θˆ
)
. This is due to the fact that(bθ′ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ′)) = (a¯, a¯) implies that a¯ is a
best reply to a¯ for type θ′. Note that pi (a¯, a¯) ≥ pi
(
bθ˚ (θ′) , bθ′
(
θ˚
))
by Theorem 1.3.
(a) If uθ′ (a1, a2) > uθ′ (a¯, a¯) let
(
b˜θ′
(
θˆ
)
, b˜θˆ (θ′)
)
= (a1, a2).
(b) If uθ′ (a1, a2) ≤ uθ′ (a¯, a¯) let
(
b˜θ′
(
θˆ
)
, b˜θˆ (θ′)
)
= (a¯, a¯).
By point 1,
(
µ˜, b˜
)
is a focal configuration (with respect to (µ, b)). By point 2 the mutant θˆ earns weakly more
than θ˚ against lower types. By point 3 the mutant θˆ earns the same as θ˚ against all incumbents of level nθ˚. By 3
and 4, (and the assumption that θ˚ deos not play efficiently against itself) the mutant θˆ earns strictly more than
θ˚ against θˆ. By 5 the mutant θˆ earns weakly more than θ˚ against all incumbents of higher cognitive level. In
total average fitness earned by θˆ is strictly higher than that of θ˚, against a population who follows
(
µ˜, b˜
)
. This
implies that µ′ is a strictly better reply against µ∗ in the population game Γ(µ˜,b˜). Thus, µ
∗ is not a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, and therefore it is not an NSS of Γ(µ˜,b˜), which implies that that µ
∗ is not an NSC.
B Variant with Uniform Deception
In this section we describe how to adapt our model in a way that requires players to use the same mixed action in
their deception efforts towards all opponents with lower cognitive levels. We implement this change by replacing
the definition of configuration with a new notion of configuration with uniform deception.
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Definition 18. A configuration with uniform deception is a pair (µ, b) where µ ∈ ∆ (U) is a type distribution,
and b : C (µ)× C (µ) −→ ∆ (A) is a behavioural policy such that
1. For each type θ ∈ C (µ) , there exists σ˜ (θ) that satisfies
σ˜ (θ) ∈ arg max
σ∈∆(A)
 ∑
θ′∈C(µ), nθ′<nθ
µ (θ′) · max
σ′∈BRu(σ)
uθ (σ, σ′)
 , and
2. For each θ, θ′ ∈ C (µ); bθ (θ′) = σ˜ (θ) and
nθ = nθ′ =⇒ (bθ (θ′) , b′θ (θ)) ∈ NE (θ, θ′) , and
nθ > nθ′ =⇒ bθ′ (θ) ∈ BRuθ′ (σ˜ (θ)) .
We interpret σ˜ (θ) as the strategy that lower levels are deceived into believing is being played by type θ, and
we interpret bθ (θ′) as the strategy of type θ when being matched with type θ′.
We restrict our definition of a neutrally stable configuration to a configuration with uniform deceptions:
Definition 19. A configuration (µ, b) is a neutrally stable configuration (NSC) with uniform deception, if for
every µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ), there is some ε¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that if (µ˜, b˜), where µ˜ = (1− ε) ·µ+ ε ·µ′, is a focal configuration
with uniform deceptions, then µ is an NSS in the type game Γ(µ˜,b˜).
An analogous change can be made to the setup of interdependent preferences. All other details of the model
are unchanged. It is relatively straightforward to see that all our results hold also in this setup of uniform
deceptions, with minor adaptations to the proofs.
C Constructions of Heterogeneous NSCs in Examples
The first subsection presents a lemma on stable heterogeneous populations, which will later be used to construct
NSCs in the Rock-Paper-Scissors and Hawk-Dove games, with type-neutral and type-interdependent preferences.
C.1 A Useful Lemma on Stable Heterogeneous Populations
Consider a configuration (µ, b), consisting of a type distribution with (finite) support C (µ) ⊆ {(u, n)}∞n=1, and
behaviour policies such that
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =

t if nθ > nθ′
w if nθ = nθ′
s if nθ < nθ′
. (3)
Thus t is the payoff that a player of type θ earns when deceiving an opponent of type θ′, and s is the payoff earned
by the deceived party. When two individuals of the same type meet they earn w. Our first lemma concerns the
type game Γ(µ,b) that is induced by a configuration (µ, b), such that C (µ) ⊆ {(u, n)}∞n=1 and with behaviour
policies given by (3). Although we have normalised k1 = 0 in the main text, we do not omit reference to k1 in
what follows. This is done to simplify the proofs.
Lemma 2. Suppose t ≥ w ≥ s. Suppose that there is an N such that
kN − k1 ≤ t− s < kN+1 − k1, (4)
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and suppose that
t− w > kn+1 − kn for all n ≤ N . (5)
Consider the type game Γ(µ,b) induced by a configuration (µ, b) with a type distribution such that C (µ) ⊆
{(u, n)}∞n=1, and with behaviour policies given by (3).
1. If 2w < s + t then Γ(µ,b) has a unique ESS µ∗ ∈ ∆ (C (µ)), which is mixed, i.e. C (µ∗) > 1, and in which
no type above N is present, i.e. C (µ∗) ⊆ {(u, n)}Nn=1.
2. If 2w = s+ t then Γ(µ,b) has an NSS µ∗ ∈ ∆ (C (µ)), which is mixed, i.e. C (µ∗) > 1, and in which no type
above N is present, i.e. C (µ∗) ⊆ {(u, n)}Nn=1.
3. If 2w > s+ t then Γ(µ,b), admits no NSS and hence no ESS.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to proving this result.
First note that that type (u,N + 1) earns strictly less than (u, 1) at all population states, and (u,N) earns
at least as much as (u, 1) at least at some population state. This immediately follows from s ≤ w ≤ t and
t − kN+1 < s − k1 and s − k1 ≤ t − kN . For this reason it is sufficient to consider the type distributions with
support in {(u, n)}Nn=1. The payoffs for a type game with all these types present are
(u, 1) (u, 2) (u, 3) . . . (u,N − 1) (u,N)
(u, 1) w − k1 s− k1 s− k1 . . . s− k1 s− k1
(u, 2) t− k2 w − k2 s− k2 . . . s− k2 s− k2
(u, 3) t− k3 t− k3 w − k3 . . . s− k3 s− k3
...
...
...
... . . .
...
...
(u,N − 1) t− kN−1 t− kN−1 t− kN−1 . . . w − kN−1 s− kN−1
(u,N) t− kN t− kN t− kN . . . t− kN w − kN
,
or in matrix form
A =

w − k1 s− k1 s− k1 . . . s− k1 s− k1
t− k2 w − k2 s− k2 . . . s− k2 s− k2
t− k3 t− k3 w − k3 . . . s− k3 s− k3
...
...
... . . .
...
...
t− kN−1 t− kN−1 t− kN−1 . . . w − kN−1 s− kN−1
t− kN t− kN t− kN . . . t− kN w − kN

.
Inspecting the matrix A we make the following observation:
Claim 3. Consider the game with payoff matrix A. Suppose (5) holds.
1. (u, n+ 1) is the unique best response to n for all n ∈ {1, .., N − 2}.
(a) If t− kN > s− k1 then (u,N) is the unique best reply to (u,N − 1).
(b) If t− kN = s− k1 then (u,N) and (u, 1) are the only two best replies to (u,N − 1).
(c) (u, 1) is the unique best response to (u,N).
Proof. Condition (5) implies that t− kN+1 > w− kN , and the definition of N implies t− kN+1 < s− k1. Taken
together this implies that w − kN < s− k1, which means that (u, 1) is the unique best response to (u,N).
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The definition of N entails t − kN ≥ s − k1. If t − kN > s − k1 then (u,N) is the unique best reply to
(u,N − 1). If t − kN = s − k1 then (u,N) and (u, 1) are the only two best replies to (u,N − 1). Furthermore,
(5) implies that (u, n+ 1) is the unique best response to (u, n) for all n ∈ {1, .., N − 2}.
It is an immediate consequence of the above lemma that all Nash equilibria of A are mixed; i.e. that they
have more than one type in their support. Next, we examine the stability properties of such equilibria. As
discussed in the proof of Theorem 3, it is well-known that if A is negative definite (semi-definite) with respect
to the tangent space, i.e. if v ·Av < 0 for all v ∈ Rd0 = {v ∈ Rd :
∑d
i=1 vi = 0}, v 6= 0, then A admits a unique
ESS (but not necessarily a unique NSS). Moreover, the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of NSS and
constitutes a nonempty convex subset of the simplex (Hofbauer & Sandholm 2009, Theorem 3.2).
One can show:
Claim 4. If 2w ≥ (≤) s+ t then A is positive (negative) semi-definite w.r.t. the tangent space.
Proof. Let
K =

−k1 −k1 . . . −k1
−k2 −k2 . . . −k2
...
... . . .
...
−kN −kN . . . −kN
 , B =

w s . . . s
t w . . . s
...
... . . .
...
t t . . . w
 ,
so that
A = B + K.
Note that v′Kv = 0 for all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0, so that v′Av < 0 for all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0, if and only if v′Bv < 0 for
all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0. Moreover, note that v′Bv < 0 for all v ∈ RN0 , v 6= 0, if and only if v′B¯v < 0 for all v ∈ RN0 ,
v 6= 0, where
B¯ = 12
(
B + BT
)
.
One can transform the problem to one of checking negative definiteness with respect to RN−1 rather than the
tangent space RN0 ; see, e.g. Weissing (1991). This is done with the N × (N − 1) matrix P defined by
pij =

1 if n = jand n, j < N
0 if n 6= jand n, j < N
−1 if n = N
.
We have
P′B¯P =
(
w − 12 (s+ t)
)
(I + 11′) ,
where 1 is an N − 1-dimensional vector with all entries equal to 1, and I is the identity matrix. The matrix
P′B¯P has one eigenvalue (of multiplicity N − 1) that is equal to 2w − (s+ t). Finally, note that this eigenvalue
is non-negative if and only if 2w ≥ (s+ t).
It follows that if 2w ≤ s+ t then the game with payoff matrix A admits an NSS. If 2w > s+ t then the game
does not have a mixed NSS. We are now able to prove Lemma 2.
1. If 2w < s+ t then by Lemma 4 A is negative definite w.r.t. the tangent space, implying that it has a unique
ESS. Lemma 3 implies that there can be no pure Nash equilibria (and hence no pure ESS). Thus A has
a unique Nash equilibrium, which is mixed. As observed earlier, type (u,N + 1) (and higher types) earn
strictly less than (θ, 1) for all population states, which implies that that this unique equilibrium remains
an ESS also when they are included in the set of feasible types.
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2. If 2w = s + t then A is both positive and negative semi-definite w.r.t. the tangent space. In this case
A does not have an ESS but it does have a set of NSSs, all of which are Nash equilibria. Moreover, we
know that A has no pure NE, and so all NSS are mixed. Again, type (u,N + 1) (and higher types) can be
ignored because they always earn strictly less than (θ, 1).
3. If 2w < s+ t then A is positive definite w.r.t. the tangent space, implying that it has no NSC.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3: Construction of Equilibrium in Rock-Paper-Scissors
Game
Formally the behaviour of the incumbent types is as follows:
b∗θ (θ′) =

(0, 1, 0) if nθ > nθ′( 1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
if nθ = nθ′
(1, 0, 0) if nθ < nθ′
.
Under the described behavioural policy we have
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =

1 if nθ > nθ′
0 if nθ = nθ′
−1 if nθ < nθ′
.
Start by restricting attention to the set of types {(upi, n)}∞n=1. That is, for the moment we use {(upi, n)}∞n=1
instead of Θ as the set of all types. All definitions can be amended accordingly. Lemma 2 in Appendix B implies
that there is an NSC (µ∗, b∗), such that C (µ∗) ⊆ {(upi, n)}Nn=1, and µ∗ is mixed. Lemma 2 establishes that the
type game between the types {(upi, n)}Nn=1 behaves much like an N -player version of a Hawk-Dove game: it has a
unique symmetric equilibrium that is in mixed strategies and that is neutrally or evolutionarily stable, depending
on whether the payoff matrix of the type game is negative semi-definite, or negative definite, with respect to the
tangent space.
It remains to show that types not in {(upi, n)}∞n=1 are unable to invade. Suppose a mutant of type (u′, n′)
enters. Incumbents of level n > n′ will give the mutant a belief that induces the mutant to play some action a′
and then play action a′ + 1mod 3, which is the incumbents’ best response to a′. Thus, against incumbents of
level n > n′ the mutant earns −1. Against incumbents of level n < n′, the mutant will earn at most 1. Against
incumbents of level n′ the mutant earns at most 0. Against itself the mutant (or a group of mutants for that
matter) will earn 0. Thus any mutant of level n′ earns weakly less than the incumbents of level n′, in any focal
post-entry configuration.
Remark 5. Our analysis is similar to that of Conlisk (2001). Like us, he works with a hierarchy of cognitive types
(though in his case it is fixed and finite), where higher cognitive types carry higher cognitive costs. He stipulates
that when a high type meets a low type the high type gets 1 and the low type gets −1. If two equals meet both
get 0. He shows that there is a neutrally stable equilibrium of this game between types (using somewhat different
arguments than we do), and explores comparative static effects of changing costs. However, unlike in our model,
in Conlisk’s model all individuals have the same materialistic preferences and the payoffs earned from deception
are not derived from an underlying game.
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C.3 Proof of Proposition 8: Construction of Equilibrium in Hawk-Dove and Type-
Interdependent Preferences
Formally, the behaviour of an incumbent θ ∈ C (µ∗) facing another incumbent θ′ ∈ C (µ∗) is given by
b∗θ (θ′) =
{
D if nθ ≥ nθ′
H if nθ < nθ′
. (6)
Under the described behavioural policy we have, for θ, θ′ ∈ {(un, n)}∞n=1,
pi (bθ (θ′) , bθ′ (θ)) =

1 + g if nθ > nθ′
1 if nθ = nθ′
1− l if nθ < nθ′
.
Start by restricting attention to the set of types {(un, n)}∞n=1. That is, for the moment, let {(un, n)}∞n=1, instead
of ΘID, be the set of all types. All definitions can be amended accordingly. Under this restriction on the set
of types, the desired results (i)–(iii) follow from Lemma 2 in Appendix B. For example, to see that Lemma 2
implies part (i) for the restricted type set, note that g > l implies that 2w < t + s, and g > kn+1 − kn implies
that t− w > kn+1 − kn, in the language of Lemma 2. The arguments for (ii) and (iii) are analogous.
Next, allow for a larger set of types ΘID, such that {(un, n)}∞n=1 ⊆ ΘID. The fact that part (iii) of Proposition
8 holds for the restricted set of types implies that it also holds for any larger set of types. It remains to prove
parts (i) and (ii) for the full set of types. We prove only part (i). The proof of part (ii) is very similar.
Consider a population consisting exclusively of types from the set {(un, n)}∞n=1, and assume that the type
distribution of these incumbents, together with the behaviour policy (6), would have constituted an ESC if the
type set had been restricted to {(un, n)}∞n=1. Suppose a mutant of type (u′, n′) /∈ {(un, n)}∞n=1 enters. If it is
the case that type
(
un
′
, n′
)
is not among the incumbents, then by the definition of an ESC, it must earn weakly
less against the incumbents than what the incumbents earn against each other. Thus it is sufficient to show that
the mutant of type (u′, n′) earns less than what a mutant or incumbent of the same cognitive level, i.e. type(
un
′
, n′
)
, would earn.
Against an incumbent (un, n) of level n > n′ a mutant of type (u′, n′) earns at most 1− l, and type
(
un
′
, n′
)
earns 1− l. Against an incumbent (un, n) of level n = n′ a mutant of type (u′, n′) earns at most 1− l, and type(
un
′
, n′
)
earns 1. Against incumbents (un, n) of level n < n′ a mutant of type (u′, n′) earns at most 1 + g, and
type
(
un
′
, n′
)
earns 1 + g. Thus in all cases, a mutant (u′, n′) /∈ {(un, n)}∞n=1 earns strictly less than what a
mutant or incumbent of type
(
un
′
, n′
)
earns. Hence if mutants are sufficiently rare they will earn strictly less
than incumbents in any focal post-entry configuration.
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